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WRONG MEANS TO AN UNJUST END? THE ELEVENTH 
CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN FIRST VAGABONDS CHURCH OF GOD 
First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, Fla., 
638 F.3d 756 (11th Cir. 2011) 
Fay O. Pappas

 
In 2005, Orlando Food Not Bombs (OFNB), a conglomeration of 
political activists who advocate a “right to food,” began conducting “food-
sharing events” once a week in downtown Orlando, Florida.1 OFNB 
distributed free vegan meals in Lake Eola Park to the hungry and 
homeless.
2
 Soon, however, the City began receiving complaints related to 
the number of homeless individuals who would disperse into adjacent 
neighborhoods following the events.
3
 In response, the City enacted the 
Large Group Feeding Ordinance, which required a permit for any feeding 
event likely to attract twenty-five or more people.
4
 Under the Ordinance, a 
                                                                                                                     
 * This Comment is dedicated to the memory of Pastor Brian Nichols of the First Vagabonds 
Church of God, as well as to my birthplace, the City of Orlando. I would like to first thank my 
colleagues and friends at the Florida Law Review, Professors Joe Jackson and Lyrissa Lidsky, as 
well as Mr.Glenn Katon, Esq. for their scholarship and guidance in writing this work. I’d also like 
to thank Dr. Jayashree Shivamoggi for encouraging me to start what would become a five-year 
journey (and counting) into this controversy. But most of all, I owe my sincerest thanks to my 
father, mother, and brother for their unwavering support in every endeavor I’ve pursued, this one 
being no exception. 
 1. First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, Fla. (First Vagabonds I), 578 F. 
Supp. 2d 1353, 1356 (M.D. Fla. 2008), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 610 F.3d 1274 
(11th Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 616 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2010), opinion 
reinstated in part, aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 638 F.3d 756 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 2. See id.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 1356–57. The challenged ordinance reads as follows: 
Except for activities of a governmental agency within the scope of its 
governmental authority, or unless specifically permitted to do so by a permit or 
approval issued pursuant to this Chapter or by City Council: 
 
(a) It is unlawful to knowingly sponsor, conduct, or participate in the distribution 
or service of food at a large group feeding at a park or park facility owned or 
controlled by the City of Orlando within the boundary of the Greater Downtown 
Park District without a Large Group Feeding Permit issued by the City Director of 
Families, Parks and Recreation or his/her designee. 
 
(b) It is unlawful to fail to produce and display the Large Group Feeding Permit 
during or after a large group feeding, while still on site, to a law enforcement 
officer upon demand. It is an affirmative defense to this violation if the offender 
can later produce, to the City Prosecutor or the Court, a Large Group Feeding 
Permit issued to him/her, or the group, which was valid at the time of the event. 
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person or organization can only receive two permits per year for use of the 
same park.
5
 The issue received wide-scale local media attention when an 
OFNB volunteer, Eric Montanez, was arrested after undercover Orlando 
police filmed him ladling soup to thirty homeless individuals, five above 
the legal limit.
6
  
The Ordinance also adversely affected a religious organization of 
homeless congregants: the First Vagabonds Church of God, led by Pastor 
Brian Nichols.
7
 The Church met on Sunday afternoons in Langford Park 
for song, prayer, Bible readings, and a Christian food-sharing tradition—
the breaking of bread.
8
 The heavily wooded park, which was on the far 
edge of the City, provided restrooms,
9
 a pavilion, water, and a grill for the 
congregants.
10
 Though the City did not receive any complaints regarding 
the Church’s use of Langford Park, enforcement of the Ordinance would 
make it impossible to hold services with the sacrament.
11
 
 
                                                                                                                     
(c) The Director of Families, Parks and Recreation or his/her designee shall issue a 
Large Group Feeding Permit upon application and payment of the application fee 
as established by the City. Not more than two (2) Large Group Feeding Permits 
shall be issued to the same person, group, or organization for large group feedings 
for the same park in the GDPD in a twelve (12) consecutive month period. 
 
(d) Any applicant shall have the right to appeal the denial of a Large Group 
Feeding Permit pursuant to appeal procedure in Section 18A.15 with written 
notice to the Director of Families, Parks and Recreation and with a copy to the 
City Clerk. 
ORLANDO, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 18A.09-2 (2006). 
 5. ORLANDO, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 18A.09-2(c) (2006). 
 6. See First Vagabonds I, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1357. Eric Montanez, the member who was 
arrested, was later acquitted of violating the ordinance after a high-profile jury trial. See id. at 1357 
n.8; Coverage of Eric Montanez’s Trial, Ladle Fest Day 1, THE BLOG OF ORLANDO FOOD NOT 
BOMBS (Oct. 8, 2007, 6:27PM), http://orlandofnb.blogspot.com/2007/10/coverage-of-eric-
montanezs-trial-ladle.html (“Lake Eola Ladle Fest and Eric Montanez's trial were covered by 
Channels 2, 6, 9 and 13, plus two Spanish-language TV channels, WMFE-FM (90.7, public radio) 
and the Orlando Sentinel.”); see also Group Intentionally Violates City Ordinance during “Ladle 
Fest,” WFTV.COM (Oct. 8, 2007), available at http://www.wftv.com/news/news/group-
intentionally-violating-city-ordinance-durin/nJj4C/; Sean Kinane, Food Not Bombs Activist in 
Orlando Faces Trial, WMNF.COM (Oct. 8, 2007), available at http://www.wmnf.org/news_stories/ 
food-not-bombs-activist-in-orlando-faces-trial; Kate Santich, Man who feeds homeless cleared, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Oct. 10, 2007), available at http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2007-10-
10/news/MMONTANEZ10_1_homeless-city-ordinance-feedings. 
 7. See First Vagabonds I, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1356–57. 
 8. Id. at 1358. 
 9. “Langford Park is a heavily-wooded, relatively isolated park located to the east of 
downtown Orlando.” Id. at n.9. 
 10. Id. at 1358. 
 11. Id. (“[I]n order to comply with the Ordinance, Nichols will either have to limit his 
services to twice per year, rotate them to other parks within the [Greater Downtown Park District], 
or move them to a park outside of the [Greater Downtown Park District].”). 
2
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In 2006, OFNB and the Church filed suit in the U.S. District Court for 
the Middle District of Florida against the City, alleging that the Ordinance 
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as Florida’s 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (FRFRA).
12
 The district court denied 
the City’s motion for summary judgment and, after a bench trial, concluded 
that the Ordinance lacked a rational basis to curtail the feedings and 
permanently enjoined the City from enforcing it.
13
  The City then appealed. 
In First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando,
14
 the Eleventh 
Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and held the Ordinance to be a 
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction on free speech and a valid 
regulation of expressive conduct.
15
 To reach that conclusion, the Eleventh 
Circuit made two curious moves: first, the court found it unnecessary to 
decide the question of expressive conduct at the heart of the matter, and 
second, it silently reversed an outcome-determinative factual finding of the 
district court through its misuse of the constitutional-fact doctrine. 
This Comment argues that the Eleventh Circuit incorrectly employed 
the constitutional-fact doctrine to tip the balance against free speech in this 
case—an action that trails a dangerous pattern in recent Eleventh Circuit 
jurisprudence.
16
 What follows is an explanation of the constitutional-fact 
doctrine and its relevant jurisprudence. Through that lens, this Comment 
sets forth the district court’s findings. Finally, it proceeds to analyze the 
Eleventh Circuit’s treatment of the district court’s findings and the 
reasoning behind the decision to uphold the city ordinance.  
The constitutional-fact doctrine is an extremely narrow exception by 
which appellate courts can meddle in lower courts’ authority to make 
factual determinations.
17
 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure typically 
bind an appellate court to the factual findings of the trial court.
18
 Issues of 
                                                                                                                     
 12. See id. at 1355.  
 13. Id. at 1361–62. 
 14. First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, Fla. (First Vagabonds III), 638 F.3d 
756 (11th Cir. 2011).  
 15. Id. at 758. 
 16. See infra notes 33–43 and accompanying text. 
 17. This doctrine permits an appellate court to review de novo a factual finding of the trial 
court by reclassifying that fact as a “constitutional fact,” or one where law and fact are so 
intertwined that a finding of fact has significant constitutional ramifications. See generally, Adam 
Hoffman, Note, Corralling Constitutional Fact: De Novo Fact Review in the Federal Appellate 
Courts, 50 DUKE. L. J. 1427 (2001) (arguing that a profound circuit split exists, regarding the ever-
straying use of constitutional-fact doctrine  from its  original pro-free speech Supreme Court 
precedence).  Specifically, some scholars believe that because such factual legal conclusions are 
increasingly not subject to lower court deference, that “confuses and undermines a unique First 
Amendment Tradition.” Steven Alan Childress, Constitutional Fact and Process: A First 
Amendment Model of Censorial Discretion, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1229, 1235 (1996).  
 18. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, 
must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the 
trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”). 
3
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law are reviewed de novo,
19
 but issues of fact are reviewed only for clear 
error.
20
 This deference arises from the role of the trial court as fact-
finder
21—especially where, as here, there is a bench trial and the judge is 
the sole finder of fact. The trial court is where the parties present exhibits 
and take testimony; it then makes judgment based on an in-person review 
of the evidence.
22
 Appellate courts’ lack of firsthand access to evidence—
and lack of time to adequately review that evidence—make them an 
inappropriate place for an independent review of facts.
23
 But there is at 
least one way an appellate court can review a factual finding de novo: 
appellate courts may review both issues of law and issues of 
“constitutional fact” as if for the first time.24  
This “constitutional-fact” doctrine arose, nevertheless, under extremely 
narrow circumstances for a singular purpose. According to United States 
Supreme Court precedent, if the constitutional-fact doctrine must come 
into play, it should only be used for its intended purpose—to tip the 
balance in favor of First Amendment rights. In New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan,
25
 the Chief of the Alabama state police, in his personal capacity, 
sued the New York Times for libel and defamation over a full-page ad that 
ran in the paper and graphically described violent acts against civil rights 
protestors.
26
 Giving the threat to free speech greater weight than the 
consequences of meddling in a trial court’s fact-finding role, the Supreme 
Court reviewed de novo the outcome-determinative “actual malice” 
standard and  found in favor of the New York Times.
27
 Later, in 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
28
 the Supreme Court proclaimed that an 
“excursion into factfinding” is required when the guarantees of the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments are at stake.
29
 Employing this rationale, the 
Rosenbloom Court similarly concluded that “First Amendment questions of 
                                                                                                                     
 19. “The Congress that adopted the EAJA certainly was aware of the general rule that issues 
of law are reviewed de novo while issues of fact are reviewed only for clear error.” Pierce v. 
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 584 (1988) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 
456 U.S. 273, 287, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1789, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982)). see also First Vagabonds III, 638 
F.3d at 760 (citing Gold Coast Publ’ns, Inc. v. Corrigan, 42 F.3d 1336, 1343 (11th Cir. 1994)). 
 20. Id.; see also Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1229 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 21. See supra note 19.  
  22. See United States v. Or. Med. Soc’y, 343 U.S. 326, 339 (1952) (“Face to face with living 
witnesses, the original trier of the facts holds a position of advantage from which appellate judges 
are excluded. In doubtful cases the exercise of his power of observation often proves the most 
accurate method of ascertaining the truth.” (quoting Boyd v. Boyd, 169 N.E. 632, 634 (1930))). 
 23. Id.  
 24. See supra note 17.   
 25. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 26. Id. at 256. 
 27. See id. at 285–86. 
 28. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
 29. Id. at 53–54. 
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‘constitutional fact’ compel this Court’s de novo review.”30 Furthermore, 
in Pennekamp v. Florida,
31
 the Court declared: 
The Constitution has imposed upon this Court final authority 
to determine the meaning and application of those words of 
that instrument which require interpretation to resolve judicial 
issues. With that responsibility, we are compelled to examine 
for ourselves the statements in issue and the circumstances 
under which they were made to see whether or not they do 
carry a threat of clear and present danger to the impartiality 
and good order of the courts or whether they are of a character 
which the principles of the First Amendment, as adopted by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
protect.
32
 
Thus, precedent exists to justify a narrow use of the constitutional-fact 
doctrine when First Amendment freedoms are threatened. In fact, the 
Eleventh Circuit itself has previously defined “constitutional facts” as the 
“few core facts that determine a First Amendment free speech issue.”33 It, 
however, has turned the doctrine on its head by using it to justify outcomes 
that arguably limit free speech. 
                                                                                                                     
 30. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 53–54 (“The Constitution has imposed upon this Court final 
authority to determine the meaning and application of those words of that instrument which require 
interpretation to resolve judicial issues. With that responsibility, we are compelled to examine for 
ourselves the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they were made to see whether 
or not they . . . are of a character which the principles of the First Amendment, as adopted by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protect. Clearly, then, this Court has an 
‘obligation to test challenged judgments against the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments,’ and in doing so ‘this Court cannot avoid making an independent constitutional 
judgment on the facts of the case.’”) (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190 (1964)). 
Furthermore, the Rosenbloom Court stated that the “simple fact is that First Amendment questions 
of ‘constitutional fact’ compel this Court’s de novo review.” Id. (citing Edwards v. South Carolina, 
372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 205 n.5 (1960)). 
 31. 328 U.S. 331 (1946). 
 32. Id. at 335. There is additional precedent justifying use of the constitutional-fact doctrine 
to safeguard due process or the First Amendment. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
285 (1964) (explaining that in cases where “the line between speech unconditionally guaranteed 
and speech which may be legitimately regulated” the appellate court’s duty involves “review[ing] 
the evidence to make certain that those principles have been constitutionally applied”); Edwards v. 
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (explaining that “it nevertheless remains [the reviewing 
court’s] duty in a case” involving the infringement of First Amendment rights “to make an 
independent examination of the whole record”); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951) 
(explaining that “[i]n cases where there is a claim of denial of rights under the Federal Constitution, 
this Court is not bound by the conclusions of lower courts, but will examine the evidentiary basis on 
which those conclusions are founded”); see also Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1947); 
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941). 
 33. ACLU of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1205 (11th Cir. 2009). 
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In Bloedorn v. Grube,
34
 the Eleventh Circuit used the doctrine to affirm 
the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction against a university 
permitting scheme, which the plaintiff argued violated his expressive rights 
by requiring a permit to speak in a designated free speech zone.
35
 The 
Eleventh Circuit cited Bloedorn in its en banc decision in the instant case 
to set forth the pivotal standard of review, launching its use of the 
constitutional-fact doctrine.
36
  
The language attributed to Bloedorn in the First Vagabonds opinion, 
however, is actually an internal citing reference to another, even more 
questionable Eleventh Circuit decision, ACLU of Florida v. Miami-Dade 
County School Board.
37
 That case was initiated when civil rights 
organizations and parents of elementary school children challenged the 
removal of a book about Cuba from a school library and sought a 
preliminary injunction enjoining the school board from removing the 
book.
38
 In determining the standard of review for cases involving 
preliminary injunctions, the court made an unprecedented move: it 
acknowledged that findings of fact are ordinarily reviewed only for clear 
error, but concluded that the standard of review “changes in First 
Amendment cases like this one.”39 The court then reviewed de novo what 
it considered to be the “core constitutional facts” of the case.40 The court 
explained the consequences of this action: “That means if we disagree with 
the district court’s finding about the Board’s motive, its decision to enter a 
preliminary injunction was an abuse of discretion.”41 By using the 
constitutional-fact doctrine to revise key findings of fact in a way that 
tipped the scale against First Amendment freedoms, the court destroyed 
the foundation for the injunction.
42
 
The irony here should not be discounted. The Eleventh Circuit is 
employing a doctrine developed in recognition of the importance of First 
Amendment freedoms to restrict those same freedoms. In his blunt dissent 
in ACLU of Florida, Judge Charles R. Wilson made clear his disapproval 
of the decision, when he opined that “[w]hile the majority may disagree 
with the district court about what testimony and evidence was more 
                                                                                                                     
 34. 631 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 35. Id. at 1225. 
 36. First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, Fla. (First Vagabonds III), 638 F.3d 
756, 760 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e review the core constitutional facts de novo, unlike historical 
facts, which are measured only for clear error.” (quoting Bloedorn, 631 F.3d at 1229) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 37. 557 F.3d 1177, 1198 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e review de novo the core constitutional 
fact.”). 
 38. Id. at 1183. 
 39. Id. at 1198. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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credible and persuasive, this is not the majority’s place.”43 
To examine the use (and misuse) of the constitutional-fact doctrine, we 
begin with a brief overview of the district court’s initial findings. In 
coming to its decision to permanently enjoin Orlando’s Ordinance, the 
district court employed a modernized version of the test for expressive 
conduct used in Texas v. Johnson.
44
 The court examined, first, whether 
OFNB intended to convey a message and, second, whether that message 
was likely to be understood by third parties.
45
 Without any difficulty, the 
court found OFNB’s message—that society “should provide food for all of 
its members, regardless of wealth”46—sufficient, rejecting the City’s 
assertion that the message lacked the required specificity.
47
 Next, the court 
asked whether this message was cognizable to third parties.
48
 At trial, 
Orlando Mayor Buddy Dyer stated that he believed that OFNB provided 
food to advance its political message.
49
 In addition, a video clip presented 
at trial showed a police officer at a food-sharing event stating his opinion 
that feedings were held for political purposes.
50
 Recognizing that OFNB’s 
use of “signs, T-shirts, and buttons”51 likely enhanced the 
comprehensibility of OFNB’s message, the court concluded that the 
testimony was adequate to satisfy the second prong of the modified 
Johnson test, finding that OFNB’s conveyed message was “understood by 
the public.”52 Thus, the district court concluded that OFNB’s food-sharing 
events were expressive conduct within the scope of the Free Speech Clause 
of the First Amendment.
53
 
After finding that OFNB’s conduct constituted speech protected by the 
First Amendment, the district court then examined the constitutionality of 
the Ordinance’s restrictions on that speech.54 The court first inquired 
whether the Ordinance was content-based
55
 or content-neutral, a distinction 
                                                                                                                     
 43. Id. at 1232 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 44. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). The Johnson test originally required that the message asserted be 
“particularized,” or specific, id. at 404, a requirement later qualified by the Eleventh Circuit, which 
only required “some” message. See Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1270 
(11th Cir. 2004). 
 45.  First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, Fla. (First Vagabonds I), 578 F. 
Supp. 2d 1353, 1358–59 (M.D. Fla. 2008). 
 46. Id. at 1358. 
 47. Id. Although the City had asserted that OFNB lacked the “particularized” message 
required in Johnson, id., the Eleventh Circuit had previously noted that only “some” message must 
be communicated, see Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1270, and that requirement was met here. 
 48. See First Vagabonds I, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1358. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1358–59. 
 51. Id. at 1359. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. at 1359–61. 
 55. Id. at 1359. “As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from 
7
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that determines the level of scrutiny that the court will apply.
56
 In finding 
that the Ordinance did not facially discriminate amongst speakers and  
appeared to apply equally to all,
57
 the court labeled the Ordinance content-
neutral; thus, intermediate scrutiny applied.
58
 The court then turned to 
whether the Ordinance’s restrictions furthered an “important government 
interest” under the intermediate scrutiny test.59 
To justify the Ordinance, the City offered three main concerns: public 
safety, public health, and most relevant to this discussion, the prevention of 
park overuse.
60
 Concerning public safety, the district court found no 
evidence that an uptick in crime between 2005 and 2006 had any 
connection to the food-sharing events.
61
 The City never presented evidence 
of crimes committed during feedings, around feedings, or by any event 
participants.
62
 Moreover, even assuming that a connection between the 
food-sharing events and crime did exist, the court saw no evidence that 
distributing the feedings to other parks would mitigate crime as the 
Ordinance’s drafters intended.63 
The court found the Ordinance’s purported concern for public health  
similarly suspect.
64
 The City focused on litter and excess garbage, but the 
court found that no evidence indicated a littering problem was connected to 
the food-sharing events.
65
 In fact, the court noted that OFNB did not use 
disposable items and that its members “le[ft] the park cleaner than it was 
                                                                                                                     
disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based.” Id. (quoting 
Turner v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Another way of 
viewing content-based regulations is asking whether the regulation is viewpoint-discriminatory. See 
Turner, 512 U.S. at 685 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The implication is 
that content-based discriminatory regulations are owed greater scrutiny by the court. Id. 
 56. See Burk v. Augusta-Richmond Cnty., 365 F.3d 1247, 1251 (11th Cir. 2004). A content-
neutral ordinance “places no restrictions on . . . either a particular viewpoint or any subject matter 
that may be discussed,” First Vagabonds I, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1359 (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 
U.S. 703, 723 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted), and “applies equally to all, and not just to 
those with a particular message or subject matter in mind,” id. (quoting Burk, 365 F.3d at 1254) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). A content-neutral regulation requires the additional evaluation 
of whether the regulation furthers a substantial or important government interest. See Burk, 365 
F.3d at 1251. 
 57. See First Vagabonds I, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1359. 
 58. Id.; see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 522 (2001) (“All three members of the 
panel agreed with the petitioners and the Government that the federal and Pennsylvania wiretapping 
statutes are ‘content-neutral’ and therefore subject to ‘intermediate scrutiny’”).    
 59. Id. at 1359 (“Accordingly, the Court finds that the Ordinance is content-neutral and must 
now determine whether the Ordinance is adequately supported by an important governmental 
interest.”). 
 60. See id. at 1360. 
 61. See id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
8
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when they arrived.”66 The court found the “rotating parks” rationale behind 
the Ordinance unpersuasive; even assuming that a littering problem 
existed, the regulation would only distribute the garbage among different 
parks, rather than decrease it.
67
 
Finally, the court examined the City’s evidence that its park system was 
being overused—evidence that, once more, the court found lacking.68 Lisa 
Early, the City’s Director of Families, Parks and Recreations, testified that 
between 2005 and 2007, her department observed an “overall increase” in 
the use of the park system.
69
 But the City not only failed to connect the 
overall rise in use with the food-sharing events, it also failed to offer “any 
credible evidence of overuse.”70 Indeed, the court noted that the Ordinance 
did nothing to limit the size of groups once they received permits and 
therefore that it would do nothing to prevent “twenty-five different groups 
from receiving permits to hold large group feedings at the same time, on a 
single day, and at the same park.”71 Thus, the court concluded that the 
Ordinance failed to address overuse.
72
 
The district court found that these three factual findings completely 
undermined the City’s rationale for the restrictions.73 The court therefore 
concluded that without a rational basis, the Ordinance was an 
unconstitutional infringement on free speech, and thus, the court 
permanently enjoined the City from enforcing it.
74
 The City appealed the 
injunction.
75
 
A three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed 2–1 in favor of the 
City, finding that OFNB’s conduct was not expressive and vacating the 
injunction.
76
 Judge Rosemary Barkett vehemently dissented.
77
 In part 
because of this vigorous dissent, the Eleventh Circuit accepted plaintiffs’ 
petition for a rehearing en banc.
78
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 66. See id. at 1360 (citing Transcript of Record at 197–98). 
 67. Id. at 1360. 
 68. See id. (“Finally, as to the City’s desire to prevent crowding, there is no evidence that the 
parks in the GDPD are being overused.”). 
 69. Id. at n.11 (citing Transcript of Record at 337, 344, 349). 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1361. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, Fla. (First Vagabonds II), 610 
F.3d 1274, 1281–82 (11th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 616 F.3d 1229 (11th 
Cir. 2010), opinion reinstated in part, aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 638 F.3d 756 
(11th Cir. 2011). 
 76. Id. at 1285, 1292. 
 77. Id. at 1294 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
 78. See First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, Fla. (First Vagabonds III), 638 
F.3d 756, 763 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the 
permanent injunction and reinstated part of the panel opinion.
79
 The court 
found that the Ordinance as applied was a reasonable time, place, or 
manner restriction and a valid regulation of expressive conduct, and it 
concluded that the Ordinance did, in fact, have a rational basis after all—
namely, mitigating the burden on the park system.
80
 Thus, the Eleventh 
Circuit silently reversed the district court’s finding of fact that the 
plaintiffs’ activities placed no burden on parks,81 a judicial sleight-of-hand 
that will now be examined. 
In its brief opinion, devoid of a dissent, the Eleventh Circuit en banc 
reversed the district court’s finding without even deciding the disputed 
question of whether OFNB’s feeding of homeless persons was expressive 
conduct.
82
 Instead, the Court concluded that, even assuming that the food-
sharing activities were protected expressive conduct, the Ordinance was 
still constitutional.
83
 It accomplished this feat by finding, on its own, that 
the City did have a substantial interest at stake—mitigating the parks’ 
overuse.
84
 This decision directly contradicted the district court’s express 
finding that there was no overuse of the parks and that the Ordinance 
would not have ameliorated overuse even if it had existed.
85
 The circuit 
court never explicitly stated its basis for rejecting the district court’s 
finding and went so far as to opine that the district court “failed to explain 
why sharing the burden of large group feedings among a larger group of 
parks and neighborhoods is not a substantial government interest.”86 And 
yet the Eleventh Circuit decided for itself, without explanation, that 
ameliorating overuse in this manner constituted a substantial interest of the 
City.
87
  
The district court in the instant case found that the facially content-
neutral regulation, which placed a burden on free speech, failed to serve a 
single interest asserted by the City.
88
 The Eleventh Circuit’s contradictory 
finding—that the Ordinance’s purported interest in ameliorating overuse of 
                                                                                                                     
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. at 762. 
 81. See First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, Fla. (First Vagabonds I), 578 F. 
Supp. 2d 1353, 1360 (M.D. Fla. 2008). 
 82. “We assume, without deciding, that the feeding of homeless persons by Orlando Food 
Not Bombs is expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment, but we uphold the 
ordinance . . . .” First Vagabonds III, 638 F.3d 756, 758 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 83. See id. 
 84. See id. at 763. 
 85. See First Vagabonds I, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1360, 1361 (“Finally, as to the City’s desire to 
prevent crowding, there is no evidence that the parks in the [Greater Downtown Park District] are 
being overused . . . [i]n sum, there is no evidence that the Ordinance furthers a substantial 
governmental interest.”). 
 86. First Vagabonds III, 638 F.3d at 762. 
 87. See id. at 763. 
 88. See supra notes 59–74 and accompanying text. 
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the park system was indeed substantial—was totally outcome-
determinative; the Court turned the question of overuse into an issue of 
constitutional fact subject to de novo review. It thereafter used the 
constitutional-fact doctrine to re-decide a factual issue upon which the case 
turns. Unfortunately, in doing so, the court also reimagined the doctrine in 
a way that endangers free speech and runs contrary to the doctrine’s 
original intent.  
The Eleventh Circuit’s transformation of the constitutional-fact 
doctrine from a means to protect free speech into a justification for 
appellate courts to interfere with factual findings heralds a troubled future 
for civil liberties in the Eleventh Circuit. The Supreme Court must clarify 
its narrow mission. If appellate courts such as the Eleventh Circuit 
continue to misuse this doctrine to limit First Amendment protections, the 
right to free speech in this country will inevitably continue to weaken. 
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